Abstract. We propose some fundamental requirements for the treatment of negative particles, positive/negative polar questions, and negative propositions, as they occur in dialogue with questions. We offer a view of negation that combines aspects of alternative semantics, intuitionist negation, and situation semantics. We formalize the account in TTR (a version of type theory with records) [6,8]. Central to our claim is that negative and positive propositions should be distinguished and that in order to do this they should be defined in terms of types rather than possible worlds. This is in contrast to [10] where negative propositions are identified in terms of the syntactic or morphological properties of the sentences which introduce them.
Introduction
In the classical formal semantics treatments for questions the denotation of a positive polar interrogative (PPInt) p? is identical to that of the corresponding negative polar (NPInt) ¬p? [15,14, for example] . This is because the two interrogatives have identical exhaustive answerhood conditions. Indeed Groenendijk and Stokhof (1997) , p. 1089 argue that this identification is fundamental.
However, other evidence calls the identification of PPInt and NPInt denotations into question. (1a,b) based on examples due to [17] seems to describe distinct cognitive states. Hoepelmann, in arguing for this distinction, suggests that (1a) is appropriate for a person recently introduced to the odd/even distinction, whereas (1b) is appropriate in a context where, say, the opaque remarks of a mathematician sow doubt on the previously well-established belief that two is even. (1c,d) seem to describe distinct investigations, the first by someone potentially even handed, whereas the second by someone tending towards DSK's innocence.
(1) a. The child wonders whether 2 is even.
b. The child wonders whether 2 isn't even. c. Epstein is investigating whether DSK should be exonerated. d. Epstein is investigating whether DSK shouldn't be exonerated. [13], who developed a view of questions as propositional abstracts, showed how such an account, combined with a theory of negative situation types developed in [5] , can distinguish between PPInts and NPInts denotations and presuppositions while capturing the identity of resolving answerhood conditions. Their account relied on a complex ad hoc notion of simultaneous abstraction. In this paper we consider a number of phenomena relating negation and dialogue, on the basis of which we develop an account of propositional negation in the framework of Type Theory with Records (TTR) [7, 8] . This account extends the earlier results in a type theoretic framework, based on standard notions of negation and abstraction. An important part of the analysis is that we distinguish semantically between positive and negative propositions. This is possible because our type theory is intensional and we have a more fine-grained notion of proposition developed from the conception of propositions as types than, for example, the notion of proposition in inquisitive semantics which is developed from the conception of propositions as sets of possible worlds. Part of our argument for making the distinction between positive and negative propositions is based on data which Farkas and Roelofsen [10] analyze in terms of inquisitive semantics where they rely on syntactic features of utterances in order to distinguish those propositions which are to count as negative.
